(2) If Oswald hadn't shot Kennedy, someone else would have
The first is an indicative conditional; the second is a counterfactual conditional. I take it that the former is true, and the latter is false. Indicative and counterfactual conditionals, then, must differ semantically. 1 A popular semantics for counterfactual conditionals gives it the following truth-conditions: 2 'A C' is true at w iff C holds at all the closest A-worlds to w. 3
In such analyses, 'closest' is here a technical term, which might then be further analyzed: Lewis (1973a Lewis ( , 1979 holds it should be unpacked in terms of the similarity of possible worlds to one another.
We know from (1) and (2) above that we cannot offer exactly the same semantics for indicative conditionals. Surely, though, the presumption has to be that the semantics of conditionals share a common form: syntactically they involve the same connective 'if'; they exhibit the same logical behaviour.
Let us therefore consider what is going on in the Oswald-Kennedy cases. It seems right to say that the counterfactual "if Oswald hadn't shot Kennedy, someone else would have" is false because at the closest worlds where Oswald doesn't shoot Kennedy (e.g. his gun doesn't go off; or he has a last minute change of heart; or he fires and misses), nobody else shoots Kennedy. Intuitively, why don't these close worlds likewise undermine the truth of the indicative conditional? I suggest it is because such worlds are inconsistent with what is taken as common ground about the case: that Kennedy got shot. Worlds where Kennedy doesn't end up being shot, I suggest, are ignored when evaluating an indicative conditional. The analysis of indicative conditionals suggested by these thoughts is the following:
'A → C' is true at w iff C holds at all the closest open A-worlds to w. 4 The account of indicative conditionals just mentioned explains why the OswaldKennedy conditionals give different results in the indicative and counterfactual formulations. In formulating this account, however, we have had to appeal to a new notion: openness of worlds. I suggest we spell this out using notions drawn from Stalnaker (1978 Stalnaker ( , 1984 . Stalnaker defines the context set, at a given stage of a conversation, to consist of all those worlds which are not collectively presupposed not to obtain. 5 This fits quite nicely with the gloss given above: that of open worlds as those which are compatible with all facts that are taken as common ground. 6 My suggestion, therefore, is that Stalnaker's context set has more than a pragmatic role in the analysis of indicative conditionals: it defines which worlds are 'left out of' the space of possibilities over which indicative conditionals are defined, and thus enters into the semantics of such conditionals. 7
The standard way in which Stalnaker appeals to the context set is quite different. For the next two sections, we shall concentrate on describing how the Stalnakerian framework can be applied to the special case of conditionals, independently of the particular thesis about their truth-conditions just advocated. We shall see, in section 3, that the Stalnakerian framework can do substantial explanatory work in a theory of conditionals, by explaining in a theory-neutral way puzzles over so-called 'Sobel' and 'reverse Sobel' cases. In section 4, I turn to the interaction between this conversational dynamics and the particular account of semantics for the indicative conditional given above. This combination turns out to
give an attractive explanation of one outstanding problem for a truth-conditional account of indicatives: the Gibbard phenomenon.
Conversation
Presuppositions change as conversations progress. As Stalnaker defines it, this will mean that the context set (those worlds which are not ruled out by one of the presuppositions in force) will be being updated constantly. Stalnaker, indeed, holds that we can analyse the dynamics of conversations by looking at the effects that assertions, denials and the like have on the context set. This very general idea is used to provide illuminating explanations of a number of otherwise puzzling linguistic phenomena. 8 Stalnaker's explanations are based on a very simple idea about how assertions interact with the context set. Recall that worlds within the context set are 'live conversational possibilities': for all that we can presuppose in making an assertion, any one of those possibilities might be actual. By uttering S assertorically, one is committing oneself to S 's being true no matter which world is actual. If the assertion is taken on board by one's conversational partners, then the presupposition that S is true no matter which world is actual is thereby established. This will typically change the context set: worlds which, if actual, would make S false, will be eliminated. The new context set will contain only worlds compatible with the new common ground. The situation is illustrated in figure 1.
An example: in the pre-existing context, we shall take it that no-one has said anything to establish any presuppositions about what minerals bananas contain.
Worlds where bananas contain potassium, and worlds where they don't, are both Depending on the details of the truth-conditions assigned, some of the ¬A-worlds may also be eliminated. On a Lewisian account of counterfactuals, any ¬A world which is closer to an A ∧C-world than it is to an A ∧ ¬C-world will be eliminated from the context set. On the material conditional account of conditionals, 
Reverse Sobel sequences
In the previous section I outlined a very general feature of the effect of asserting a conditional on the context set of a conversation: it eliminates all A ∧ ¬C worlds, without exception, from that set.
You might think this is a peculiar result for the 'closest-worlds' conditional theorist. For famously, natural language conditionals give rise to Sobel sequences, Clearly, there is normally a presupposition that the actual world is not this way:
such a world is not standardly one of the conversational possibilities. So we need not take it into consideration when considering whether the assertion was appropriate.
On the other hand, there are ways of putting such possibilities into the context set: one such way, it seems, is just by asserting 'it might be that the National Inquirer is right. . . '. 14 Another way, I would contend, is by uttering a conditional whose antecedent is true only at such a conversational possibility. 15 Thus, when I state the second element of the Sobel sequence, the context set first expands to incorporate worlds where the National Inquirer is right; and then we eliminate all the 'National Inquirer, Oswald not shooting, someone else shooting' worlds. The net effect, then, of asserting (1) and then (2), is that we end up with an expanded context set, but one without either of the following classes of worlds:
• Worlds where National Inquirer speaks nonsense, Oswald didn't shoot Kennedy, and no-one shot Kennedy (eliminated by (1)).
• Worlds where the National Inquirer speaks the truth, Oswald didn't shoot Kennedy, and someone else shot Kennedy. (eliminated by (2)).
This is illustrated in figure 3.
This seems a perfectly sensible description of the result of making such assertions, and there is nothing to suggest anything bad going on. Nothing in the story so far rests on any particular truth-conditional account of conditionals: so it may be appealed to by material-conditionals theorists as well as closest worlds accounts, whether of counterfactuals or indicatives.
On the other hand, consider the following 'reverse Sobel sequence': 16 2. If Oswald didn't shoot Kennedy and the National Inquirer was right about the existence and character of space aliens, no-one shot Kennedy.
1. If Oswald didn't shoot Kennedy, someone else shot Kennedy.
The idea here is to consider a situation where one utters (2) and then (1). In point of view of consistency, of course, nothing depends on the order in which things are asserted, so the 'closest-world' conditional theorist is standardly taken to be committed to saying exactly the same thing about this assertion as the standard Sobel assertions. Yet, the reverse Sobel sequence are far less comfortableeven infelicitous-to utter. The point I want to make here is that we can explain the difference between the respective felicity of Sobel and reverse-Sobel patterns of assertion via the conversational dynamics just sketched. In the reversed case, as before, our initial context set will standardly not contain any worlds at which the National Inquirer reports truly. But in uttering (2), we introduce such worlds into consideration. The distinctive effect of asserting that conditional, as before, is to eliminate all "National
Inquirer" worlds where Oswald didn't shoot Kennedy, but someone else did.
What would happen if we were now to utter (1)? By our initial discussion of the conversational dynamics of asserting conditionals, we know it will eliminate all Oswald-not-shooting and no-one-shooting worlds: in particular, it will eliminate those conversational possibilities where Oswald didn't shoot Kennedy, where no-one else did, and where the National Inquirer is right. Hence, uttering (1) after (2) would lead to the context set ruling out all three of the following classes of worlds:
• Worlds where the National Inquirer speaks the truth, Oswald didn't shoot Kennedy, and no-one shot Kennedy. (also eliminated by (1)). This is illustrated in figure 4 .
So, the context set resulting from asserting (1) and (2) the reverse order. We will be able to explain why the Sobel sequence is fine, while the reverse Sobel sequence is bad, if we can make the case that it is inappropriate to assert something that eliminates situations of the final class (National Inquirer speaks truth, neither Oswald nor anyone else shot Kennedy). The disputed class is highlighted in figure 5 .
It seems that such a case is available, for in the envisaged situation we have no grounds for thinking that such worlds are not actual. If the National Inquirer is right, then all our pro-shooting-of-Kennedy evidence is the result of a massive conspiracy, so for all we know, Kennedy wasn't shot at all. The difference in the conversational effects of Sobel vs. reverse Sobel sequences thus explains the difference in the acceptability of those patterns of assertion. 17 The general utility of appeal to conversational dynamics to understand the behaviour of conditionals is thus illustrated. To emphasize once again: only conversational effects common to (almost) all truth-conditional accounts of conditionals have been appealed to in explaining the potential infelicity of reverse Sobel cases (all that is required is that a conditional never be true at a world where it's antecedent is true and its consequent false). So again, this explanation is available to strict and material conditional theorists, Lewisian theorists of counterfactuals, as well analyses of indicative conditionals of the style advocated in this paper. 18
4 The Gibbard phenomenon. (Gibbard, 1980) argues against truth-conditional theories of conditionals. It is well-known that material conditional theorists avoid these worries; but they remain a standing challenge to stronger accounts of the truth-conditions of indicative conditionals. I shall show how my account of the truth-conditions of indicatives, far from falling to Gibbard's challenge, gives an attractive account of the phenomenon to which Gibbard points.
I shall follow the presentation of Gibbard phenomenon given by Bennett (2003) .
The situation to be considered features a system of water-gates and levers, which are constructed according to the following rules:
• Lever 1 down and top gate raised: water flows left
• Lever 2 down and top gate raised: water flows right
• Except! that if both levers down, then top gate can't be raised.
We have two informants, Abel and Cain. They are each standing next to a lever, out of sight and earshot of each other. Their job is to tell me what will happen to the water. Abel can see that the first lever is down. Cain can see that the second lever is down. They say:
• Abel: "If the top gate is raised, water will flow left, not right"
• Cain: "If the bottom gate is raised, water will flow right, not left"
Both utterances are perfectly appropriate. However, it is clear that what they say will happen in the event of the gate being raised can't both take place. The intuitive, and correct, conclusion for me to draw from this information is that the top gate will not be raised.
The following is then an argument for the no truth value approach to the indicative conditional. The argument is schematic: using the Abel/Cain case to rule out each potential truth-conditional approach to the indicative conditional θ:
1. Abel and Cain's utterances are both true 2. Truth-conditional account θ of indicative conditionals supports
Conditional non-contradiction means that it is not the case that Abel and
Cain's utterances are both true 4. Therefore: θ is not the right account of indicative conditionals.
The first premiss is non-negotiable for present purposes. The argument is plainly of a valid form, so if one is to resist it to defend a particular truth-conditional account of indicative conditionals, one must resist either premise (2) or (3).
A material conditional account of indicative conditionals allows one to resist at premise (2): for conditional non-contradiction does not hold for material conditionals. Famously, material conditionals suffer from the paradoxes of material implication. Whenever, A is false, A ⊃ C is true. Thus, whenever A is false, Material conditional accounts of indicative conditionals are, however, independently objectionable. Our interest is in seeing whether "closest world" accounts of indicatives fall to Gibbard-style considerations. I contend that the approach advocated in this paper allows one to rebut the argument directly. 19 We begin by noting a loophole in the argument available to all modal ac- The example is due to Adams (1975) .
2 I use ' ' for the counterfactual conditional, '→' for the indicative conditional; and '>' for an arbitrary conditional.
3 A-worlds are worlds at which A is true. The account may need to be amended if the so-called 'limit assumption' is denied-see Lewis (1973b) -but not in ways that effect the present discussion. 4 Compare Nolan (2003) , who also tries to build a 'closest world' account of indicatives on top of the Lewisian treatment of counterfactuals, by appealing to knowledge. Nolan's approach is to define a new notion of 'closeness', whereby worlds incompatible with what we know are ipso facto 'far away' from actuality. Stalnaker (1975, p.71) , giving one of the earliest defences of a 'closest world' account of indicatives, is even closer to the present proposal. But again, he suggests that an indicative conditional is defined over a space of worlds whose 'closeness ordering' is altered to favour worlds within the context set. And again, this subtle difference will be crux of the story about the Gibbard phenomenon here offered.
My account, in contrast, eliminates such worlds altogether from the space of worlds over which the conditional is defined (that is, my framework is not universal in the sense of Lewis (1973a, p.120) ). This difference will have substantial knock-on effects when we come to look at Gibbard cases.
Note also that we do not have to presuppose some substantive account of counterfactual closeness (say, along the lines of (Lewis, 1979) ) to buy into my proposal: even if the notion of counterfactual closeness is primitive, or analyzed in terms of counterfactuals rather than the other way round, we can obviously still appeal to it when giving the truth-conditions of indicatives, in the way described in the main text.
5 Presumably one can presuppose something which is false: in which case the actual world may not be an open possibility. (In Stalnaker's framework, in presupposing p where p is in fact false, we are in effect presupposing that the actual world does not obtain.) For this observation, and discussion of its potential impact on the logic of indicative conditionals, see Nolan (2004) : the threat is that instances of modus ponens fail.
The threat of unacceptable logical revisionism does not arise for those (such as Nolan (2003) and Weatherson (2001) ) who use factive attitudinal states (such as knowledge) instead of presupposition, within their account of indicative closeness. There are a number of options at this point: (Nolan, 2004) canvasses some options. Since I am not inclined to regard modus ponens as negotiable, the relevant alternatives for me are (a) to defend some broadly epistemic (and factive) substitute for Stalnakerian presuppositions; or (b) to tweak the setup laid out in the main text so that the actual world will always count as an "open possibility" even if it presupposed not to obtain. I discuss these issues in other work. 6 One can make judgements about indicative conditionals in non-conversational situations. But there is a natural understanding about what 'open worlds' are in that setting: the worlds compatible with what we believe (or know) to be the case. 7 Formally, take the set of worlds W and closeness-ordering σ over which the counterfactual conditional is defined. Given the context set C, the set of worlds over which the indicative conditional is defined as follows: W := C ∩ W. The ordering is just that induced by σ: if x is closer than z to y on the original space of worlds, and x, y, z ∈ W , then x is closer than z to y on the derived space of worlds.
8 A very nice example is the treatment of negative existentials in Stalnaker (1978) . 9 Compare Stalnaker (1984, ch.4.) . Given the actual world is an H2O world, Kripkean orthodoxy has it that "water is H2O" is true relative to every world. Nevertheless, those same sounds, uttered on twin-earth, would express a falsehood (they would not express the same proposition).
10 I suggest that the conversational effects of asserting an indicative conditional with the truth-conditions suggested earlier are the same as those described for the material conditional: once the A ∧ ¬C worlds are eliminated from the context set, there are no open A ∧ ¬C possibilities, and hence vacuously, every world in the context set is such that C holds at every closest open A-world. Of course, this doesn't mean there are no differences between the material conditional and closest-world conditional under consideration, but just that their typical effects on the context set are identical. 13 Analogous remarks apply to the assertion of a counterfactual conditional.
14 This role for 'might' utterances is advocated in Swanson (2005) . 15 That is, I contend that in uttering 'if A then C', there must either be, or one must introduce into, the context set worlds where A is true. Compare Stalnaker (1975, p.81) , who advocates the rule 'it is appropriate to make an indicative conditional statement or supposition only in a context which is compatible with the antecedent'. If the an indicative conditional is put forward where the pre-existing context set does not fit this description, then we change the context set to accommodate the assertion, by bringing in extra worlds. 16 Reverse Sobel sequences seem to first appear in print in a paper by Kai von von Fintel (2001) . von Fintel credits Irene Heim for communicating the phenomenon to him. 17 You might eliminate such worlds as a byproduct of ruling out worlds where the National Inquirer is right about such matters; but if this is ones reason, Gricean reasoning would suggest that one should simply assert this straight out, rather than uttering the indicative.
Andrew McGonigal pointed out another predication of the present account that seems to be borne out: in cases where the final class of worlds is empty, then we shouldn't expect Sobel and reverse Sobel to differ. There are trivial cases of this (where the antecedent is repeated, or adjoined to its contrary). But potentially there are more interesting test cases: where the Sobel sequences are A > C, (A ∧ B) > ¬C, and there is a standing presumption against A ∧ B ∧ ¬C worlds.
Another advocate of worlds-semantics for indicative conditionals is Weatherson (2001) (I read Weatherson's excellent article only after completing this paper). Weatherson's framework differs from the one I advocate at a number of points (e.g. unlike the approaches favoured by Nolan and myself, counterfactual closeness of worlds does not play a significant role in Weatherson's characterization of indicative closeness of worlds). However, his account and mine are similar in allowing both informants in the Gibbard scenario to be speaking truly in 'violation' of the relevant instance of conditional non-contradiction-Weatherson achieves this by introducing an "impossible world" where everything is true, and allowing its closeness to actuality to vary according to the epistemic states of the agents concerned. In recent work, Weatherson has abandoned this account of the Gibbard phenomenon in favour one based on relativism about the truth-values of conditionals.
